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Abstract.
The current DMP approach to labor markets presumes job destruction
shocks are small. We relax that assumption and also allow unfilled jobs,
like unemployment, to evolve as a state variable. Calibrating an otherwise
standard DMP framework, we identify a remarkable, (almost) perfect, fit of
the empirical facts as reported in Shimer (2005, 2012). The results, how-
ever, are also consistent with the insights of Davis and Haltiwanger (1992):
that unemployment volatility is driven by large but infrequent job separation
shocks. The approach not only provides an important synthesis of two litera-
tures which, in other contexts, have appeared contradictory, it also identifies
a more traditional view of the timing and progression of recessions.
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1 Introduction
What explains the wide variation in unemployment over the cycle - is it
due to large variations in job destruction rates or due to large variations
in the job finding rates of the unemployed - the so-called ins and outs of
unemployment? This important issue has a long history (see Darby et al
(1986), Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), Shimer (2012), Elsby et al (2009),
Fujita and Ramey (2009)) and has a major impact on how we understand
unemployment dynamics over the cycle. The current mainstream approach
adopts the Shimer (2005, 2012) and Hall (2005) view that job destruction
shocks are small and nearly acyclic. Given that, an equilibrium theory of
unemployment must then explain how small productivity shocks generate
large variations in unemployment.1 The view that job destruction shocks
are small is, however, highly controversial - see the recent survey Elsby et
al (2014). For example Kennan (2006) notes there are steep increases in
new UI claims during recessions, especially at the start of a recession. Here
we analyse an alternative equilibrium framework, one with job destruction
shocks which, when calibrated to the Shimer (2005) data, yields an (almost)
perfect fit. Furthermore using simulated data, a second calibration test finds
unemployment is much more highly correlated with variations in worker job
finding rates than with job separation rates, a result consistent with Shimer
(2012). Indeed a third calibration test, performed in Elsby et al (2014),
confirms this model yields a remarkable fit of the data. But different to
the standard approach, the results are also fully consistent with Davis and
Haltiwanger (1992): that unemployment volatility is driven by large but
infrequent job destruction shocks.
Our approach is powerful for we consider only a very natural and seem-
ingly minor variation of the standard Diamond/Mortensen/Pissarides frame-
work: namely we allow vacancies to exhibit stock dynamics with a vacancy
creation process analogous to the Diamond (1982) coconut model. This is
not an entirely novel idea - for related work see Diamond and Fudenberg
(1989), Caballero and Hammour (1994), Fujita and Ramey (2005, 2007).
This variation, however, changes the dynamic properties of the DMP frame-
1The dominant explanation is that there must be small surplus (e.g. Hagendorn and
Manovskii (2008)), though others have argued that sticky wages might play a role: see
Costain and Reiter (2008), Hall and Milgrom (2008), Mortensen and Nagypal (2008), Ha-
gendorn and Manovskii (2013), Sargent and Lyungqvist (2014) for important contributions
to this debate.
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work in a fundamental way. It is critically important when the stated aim is
to understand unemployment dynamics.
The search literature invariably simplifies the equilibrium matching ap-
proach by assuming vacancies are not a state variable. This can be done
in a variety of ways: by making a free entry of vacancies assumption (so
that vacancies evolve as a jump variable), or that vacancies are a one pe-
riod ”recruitment effort” choice, or that unfilled vacancies die at the end of
the period. This simplification, however, comes at a cost: ceteris paribus,
vacancy creation rates increase with unemployment (as it is easier for firms
to fill vacancies). The difficulty is that vacancies will then tend to covary
positively with unemployment, an outcome which is strongly counterfactual.
To avoid this outcome Shimer (2005) points out, for the free entry case, it is
necessary to assume job destruction shocks are small. Otherwise big jumps
in unemployment will generate similarly big jumps in vacancy creation.2
Allowing vacancies, like unemployment, to evolve as a stock variable is not
only a natural assumption, it is also a game-changer: we show ”stock-stock”
matching yields countercyclical vacancies even with very large job destruction
shocks. To illustrate suppose, say, a financial crisis causes a relatively short-
lived spell of high job destruction rates. Newly laid-off workers then try
to find work with the existing vacancy stock. Some are lucky and quickly
find work. Others are less lucky and, crowded out by the rising tide of
unemployed job seekers, are left chasing work. The free entry of vacancies
assumption would imply an instantaneous surge in vacancy creation. With
instead a relatively inelastic vacancy creation process, oversampling by the
rising tide of job seekers depletes the existing vacancy stock. Job finding
rates then plummet as many unemployed workers chase too few vacancies.
These dynamics would seemingly capture market behavior in a very natural
way.
Productivity shocks in the model generate similar dynamics: higher pro-
ductivity generates higher vacancy creation rates which, in turn, cause the
vacancy stock to gradually increase over time along with a declining un-
employment stock. To identify the relative importance of job destruction
shocks, we calibrate this stock-stock model of unemployment and vacancy
dynamics to the original Shimer (2005) data. Figure 1 describes the magni-
2Menzio and Shi (2011) is an important caveat. Although ”vacancies directed to the
unemployed” increase with unemployment, vacancies which are ”directed to the employed”
do not. The composite variable ”total vacancies” has complex dynamics.
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tude of log-deviations in (i) job separation rates and (ii) labor productivity
according to the Shimer (2005) data at business cycle frequencies.
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Figure 1: U.S. Separation Rates and Labor Productivity, both are in logs as devi-
ations from an HP trend with smoothing parameter 105
Although the job separation process is less persistent than the produc-
tivity process it has much greater variance. Modelling these data as AR1
processes finds the job separation and productivity innovations are strongly
negatively correlated with a cross correlation of -0.6: a positive [large] job
separation innovation is thus correlated with a [smaller] negative productivity
innovation, but low productivity is more persistent. The long-run variance
of these processes, measured as σ2/(1 − ρ), finds the long-run variance of
separation shocks is 7 times that of the productivity shocks.
The calibrated stock-stock model yields an amazing fit of the measured
volatility and persistence of unemployment, vacancies and job finding rates
as described in Shimer (2005). Furthermore the vacancy stock is almost
perfectly negatively correlated with the unemployment stock as found in
the data. We perform a second calibration test. Shimer (2012) finds that
variations in unemployment are more highly correlated with variations in
worker job finding rates. Our simulated data yields the exact same result.
The question, then, is what drives unemployment volatility? In contrast
to the current literature, it is large but infrequent job destruction shocks.
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Furthermore rather than a perfectly elastic vacancy creation condition (free
entry), an inelastic vacancy creation process ensures unemployment is highly
persistent following a large job destruction shock. The theory is thus perfectly
consistent with the empirical insights of Davis and Haltiwanger (1992).
The next section describes the model and section 3 characterises equilib-
rium. Section 4 calibrates the model and evaluates the impact of replacing the
free entry of vacancies assumption with so-called “Diamond entry”. Given
those insights, section 5 decomposes the results by type of productivity shock
and section 6 quickly relates the model to the data on new business start-ups
and employment change at existing firms over the cycle. Section 7 concludes.
2 Model
The model uses a conventional equilibrium unemployment framework with
discrete time and an infinite time horizon; e.g. Pissarides (2000). All firms
and all workers are equally productive, there are no sorting dynamics through
on-the-job search. All firms pay the same (Nash bargained) wage and each
worker-firm match survives until it is hit by a job destruction shock. The
essential difference is that vacancies evolve here as a stock variable with a
less than perfectly elastic new vacancy creation process. Vacancies are thus
a relevant state variable.
There is a fixed measure F of firms who create vacancies. In every pe-
riod, each firm has one new (independent) ”business opportunity”. Given
that opportunity, the firm compares its investment cost x against its ex-
pected return. Its expected return depends on the state of the aggregate
economy at time t, denoted Ωt which is described in detail below. We let
Jt = J(Ωt) denote the expected return of a business opportunity in state Ωt.
The investment cost x is considered as an idiosyncratic random draw from
an exogenous cost distribution H. For tractability we assume this investment
cost captures all of the idiosyncratic features associated with any given busi-
ness venture - in other words, highly profitable opportunities correspond to
low realised values of x. Should the firm decide to invest, it pays the upfront
cost x and then holds an unfilled job with expected value Jt; i.e. each new
investment generates one new vacancy.
Following Diamond (1982), each firm invests in its business opportunity
if and only if it has positive value; i.e. when x ≤ Jt. This requires no recall
of a business opportunity should the firm not immediately invest in it. As
5
investment occurs whenever x ≤ Jt then, at the aggregate level, it = FH(Jt)
describes total period t new vacancy creation. We refer to this investment
process as Diamond-entry and note that a higher aggregate return Jt yields
greater vacancy creation rate it.
To describe how the firm goes about hiring a worker, we adopt the stan-
dard matching framework (but without free entry). There is a unit measure
of equally productive and infinitely lived workers. All workers and firms are
risk neutral and have the same discount factor 0 < β < 1. Workers switch
between being employed and unemployed depending on their realised labour
market outcomes.
Each period is characterised by the number vt of vacancies (currently
unfilled jobs) and the number ut of unemployed workers (so that 1 − ut
describes the number employed). The hiring process is frictional: the number
mt of new job-worker matches in period t is described by a matching function
mt = m(ut, vt), where m(.) is positive, increasing, concave and homogenous
of degree one.
While unemployed a job seeker enjoys per period payoff z > 0. In period
t, each job-worker match produces the same market output p = pt, where
aggregate productivity pt evolves according to an exogenous AR1 process
(described below). Job destruction is also an exogenous, stochastic process.
δt describes the probability that any given job-worker match is destroyed. In
the event of such a job destruction shock, the worker becomes unemployed
and the job’s continuation payoff is zero. This job destruction parameter, δt,
also evolves according to an exogenous AR1 process (described below).
We next describe the sequence of events within each period t. Each period
has 5 stages:
Stage I [new realisations]: given (pt−1, δt−1) from the previous period,
new values of pt, δt are realised according to
ln pt = ρp ln pt−1 + εt
ln δt = ρδ ln δt−1 + (1− ρδ) ln δ + ηt
where (εt, ηt) are white noise innovations drawn from the Normal distribution
with mean zero, covariance matrix Σ, δ > 0 is the long-run average job
destruction rate while long-run productivity p is normalised to one;
Stage II [bargaining and production]: the wage wt is determined
by Nash bargaining. Production takes place so that a job match yields one
period profit pt − wt while the employed worker enjoys payoff wt. Each un-
employed worker enjoys payoff z;
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Stage III [vacancy investment]: firms invest in new vacancies it;
Stage IV [matching]: let ut,vt denote the stock of unemployed job
seekers and vacancies at the start of this stage. Matching takes place so that
mt = m(ut, vt) describes the total number of new matches;
Stage V [job destruction]: each vacancy and each filled job is inde-
pendently destroyed with probability δt.
3 Markov Dynamics and Equilibrium.
This section describes the (Markov) equilibrium dynamics. As ut is defined
as the number unemployed in period t immediately prior to the matching
stage (stage IV), then ut evolves according to:
ut = ut−1 + δt−1(1− ut−1)− (1− δt−1)mt−1 (1)
where mt−1 = m(ut−1, vt−1). The second term describes the stock of employed
workers in period t − 1 who become unemployed through a job destruction
shock. The last term describes the match outflow where such matches are
also subject to the period t− 1 job destruction shock.
The vacancy stock dynamics are given by
vt = (1− δt−1)[vt−1 −mt−1] + it, (2)
where the first term describes those vacancies which survive (unfilled) from
the previous matching event, while it describes new vacancy creation.
To determine equilibrium new vacancy creation it we restrict attention to
Markov equilibria. Once (pt, δt) are realised, define the intermediate stock of
vacancies
v˜t = (1− δt−1)[vt−1 −mt−1]
which is the number of surviving vacancies carried over from the previous
matching event. When bargaining occurs in stage II, let Ωt = {pt, δt, ut, v˜t}
denote the corresponding state space. As described below, any standard
Nash bargaining procedure yields a wage rule of the form wt = w
N(Ωt).
Stage III then determines optimal investment it = i(Ωt). As the matching
and separation dynamics ensure Ωt evolves as a first order Markov process,
then Ωt is indeed a sufficient statistic for optimal decision making in period
t.
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We next characterise the Bellman equations describing optimal behaviour.
In period t and at the start of stage II with state vector Ωt (i.e. prior to
production and matching but after new pt, δt have been realised) let:
Jt = J(Ωt) denote the expected value of a vacancy;
JFt = J
F (Ωt) denote the expected value of a filled job;
V Ut = V
U(Ωt) denote the worker’s expected value of unemployment;
V Et = V
E(Ωt) denote the worker’s expected value of employment.
Let E[.|Ωt] denote the expectations operator given period t state vector
Ωt. The timing of the model implies the value functions Jt, J
F
t are defined
recursively by:
Jt = −c+ β(1− δt)E
{
m(ut, vt)
vt
JFt+1 + [1−
m(ut, vt)
vt
]Jt+1|Ωt
}
(3)
JFt = pt − wt + β(1− δt)E{JFt+1|Ωt}. (4)
The worker value functions are also defined recursively:
V Ut = z + βE
[
V Ut+1 + (1− δt)
m(ut, vt)
ut
[
V Et+1 − V Ut+1
] |Ωt] (5)
V Et = wt + βE
[
V Et+1 + δt+1[V
U
t+1 − V Et+1]|Ωt
]
. (6)
Diamond entry implies the reservation cost rule - invest if and only if cost
x ≤ JPt . Equilibrium new vacancy creation it = i(Ωt) is given by:
it = FH(Jt), (7)
where Jt = J(Ωt).
Assuming workers have bargaining power φ ∈ [0, 1], the axiomatic Nash
bargaining approach closes the model with
(1− φ) [V Et − V Ut ] = φ [Jt − JVt ] .
Using the above equations, this condition determines the equilibrium wage
wt = w(Ωt). The above thus yields a system of autonomous, first order dif-
ference equations determining (i) the evolution of Ωt and (ii) the equilibrium
value functions with corresponding investment rule it = i(Ωt).
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4 Calibration and Comparative Dynamics.
The central issue of interest is to compare the dynamic properties of the
standard textbook model with free entry where vacancies evolve as a jump
variable (”stock-jump” dynamics) against a model of Diamond entry where
vacancies evolve as a stock variable (”stock-stock” dynamics). Specifically
we assess the extent to which unemployment and vacancy dynamics are
consistent with their:
(a) observed volatilities over the business cycle;
(b) observed persistences over the cycle, and
(c) the Beveridge curve - the observed negative covariance between un-
employment and vacancies.
4.1 Calibration Parameters.
As the framework is so standard, we simply adopt the calibration parameters
as described in Mortensen and Nagypal (2007). Specifically we assume each
period corresponds to one month, a standard Cobb-Douglas matching func-
tion m = Auγv1−γ and the following Mortensen/Nagypal parameter values.
Table 1: Mortensen/Nagypal Parameters
Parameter Value
γ elasticity parameter on matching function 0.6
φ worker bargaining power 0.6
z outside value of leisure 0.7
β monthly discount factor 0.9967
Notice that bargaining is efficient in the sense that the Hosios condition
is satisfied. As the productivity process for pt (described below) ensures its
(long run) mean value p is equal to one, surplus (p − z)/z = 43% is large.
The monthly discount factor implies an annual discount rate of 4%.
We next calibrate the stochastic process for {pt, δt}. Figure 1 in the Intro-
duction describes the quarterly measures of aggregate productivity and sep-
aration rates as obtained in Shimer (2005). As these data are only recorded
quarterly while the model adopts a monthly time structure, we choose the
autocorrelation parameters ρp, ρδ and covariance matrix Σ so that the im-
plied process (pt, δt), when reported at quarterly intervals, matches the first
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order autocorrelation and cross correlation implied by the data. Doing this
yields:
Table 2: (pt, δt) Stochastic Process
Parameter Value
ρp productivity autocorrelation 0.978
ρδ separation autocorrelation 0.925
σp st. dev. productivity shocks 0.0064
σδ st. dev. separation shocks 0.031
ρpδ cross correlation -0.60
The job destruction innovations are negatively correlated with the pro-
ductivity innovations. Although the separation process is less persistent than
the productivity process it has much greater variance.
The framework is further calibrated to fit the long run turnover means.
To ensure comparability of results, we follow Shimer (2005) who argues that
(i) the mean job separation probability should equal 3.4% per month, (ii) the
average duration of an unemployment spell is 2.2 months and thus the long
run unemployment rate equals u = 7%. We also note the average duration
of vacancies is around 3 weeks (Blanchard and Diamond (1989)). For the
free entry case, Table 3 describes the remaining parameter values so that the
model fits these turnover means.
Table 3: Turnover Parameters [free entry]
Parameter Free Entry Case Value
c per period vacancy posting cost 0.17
A scale parameter on matching function 0.594
δ mean monthly job separation probability 0.034
Before describing the calibration results for the textbook model with free
entry, however, we next describe how we calibrate the model with ”Diamond
entry”. For comparability we maintain the parameter values described in
Tables 1 and 2. As turnover with Diamond entry is different, however, we
have to recalibrate the turnover parameters in Table 3.
When calibrating a DMP framework, it is often found the advertising cost
c must be large. This is typically motivated by arguing it reflects previously
sunk job creation investments. Here we take the converse case: we instead
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attribute all job creation costs to the ex-ante investment process x ∼ H(.)
and presume small advertising costs c = 0 (say jobs are filled by word of
mouth recommendations).
Given vacancy creation rule it = FH(Jt), we adopt the functional form
it = FJ
ξ
t (8)
where ξ describes the elasticity of new vacancy creation with respect to va-
cancy value. ξ = ∞ would describe infinitely elastic new vacancy creation
(analogous to the free entry case) while ξ = 0 would imply perfectly inelastic
(fixed) new vacancy creation. In what follows we consider two cases. The
first follows Fujita and Ramey (2005) which assumes H is uniform; i.e. ξ = 1
and so new vacancy creation is neither elastic nor inelastic.
The second calibrates ξ using the results of Merz and Yashiv (2007). That
paper estimates a representative firm structure where the firm’s cost of cre-
ating i new vacancies is ptNtc(i/Nt) where pt is aggregate productivity, Nt
is firm employment and c(.) is a convex function. Note this cost structure
implies constant returns to hiring: a firm which has twice the number of em-
ployees N and wishes to create twice as many new vacancies i has double the
hiring costs. If Jt describes the expected return to a new vacancy, optimality
implies the first order condition
ptc
′(
it
Nt
) = Jt, (9)
so that the marginal cost of creating a new vacancy equals its expected
return. The estimates in Merz and Yashiv (2007) find c(.) is close to a cubic.
Optimality thus implies the vacancy creation condition:
it =
[
ANt
p0.5t
]
Jt
1/2. (10)
Comparing equation (10) with (8), noting that variations in aggregate em-
ployment Nt and productivity pt are small and both are procyclical, suggests
ξ = 1/2.
With c = 0 and δ = 0.034, Table 1d reports the calibrated parameter
values for A,F so that ”Diamond entry” with ξ = 1 or with ξ = 1/2 fits the
long run turnover means.
11
Table 4: Turnover Parameters [Diamond Entry]
Parameter Diamond entry Value
A scale parameter on matching function 0.594
F (ξ = 1) entrepreneurial activity 0.0075
F (ξ = 1/2) entrepreneurial activity 0.0157
4.2 Results
We report the results in three parts. The first describes the implied volatility
of unemployment, vacancies and the vacancy/unemployment ratio for the
three calibrated models and compares them to the data. The second describes
the persistence and the covariance of unemployment and vacancies over the
cycle (Beveridge curve). In all results, Column 1 describes the empirical
measures taken from Shimer (2005). The other columns are the equivalent
measures using data generated by the calibrated models, where column 2
describes the free entry case, column 3 is the Diamond entry case with ξ = 1
and column 4 is the case ξ = 1/2.
4.3 Volatility in unemployment and vacancies.
Table 5 reports business cycle volatility measured as the standard deviation
of unemployment (σu), of vacancies (σv) and of the vacancy/unemployment
ratio (σv/u) from trend.
3
Table 5: Volatility of unemployment and vacancies
Volatility Data Free Entry Diamond ξ = 1 Diamond ξ = 1/2
σu 0.19 0.08 0.15 0.17
σv 0.20 0.05 0.14 0.17
σv/u 0.38 0.07 0.28 0.34
Notes: σu: standard deviation of variable u. To calculate the statistics:
simulated data are quarterly averages of monthly series, in logs as deviations
from an HP trend with smoothing parameter 105.
Consistent with the arguments in Shimer (2005), the free entry case (col-
umn 2) explains only around one third to one half of the observed volatility.
3The model-generated data was passed through an HP filter with parameter 105 and
the standard deviations are measured as deviations from the trend.
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By introducing vacancy stock dynamics into the framework, ”Diamond en-
try” increases volatility in all variables. The case ξ = 1/2 generates volatil-
ities which are very close to the data. Indeed if our aim were to exactly fit
the data, we would need ξ '1/4; i.e. the job creation process needs to be
more inelastic.
To understand why dropping the free entry assumption yields such a huge
improvement in model fit, Figures 2 and 3 describe the impulse response
function of unemployment and vacancies to a single separation innovation at
date zero (holding productivity fixed pt = 1).
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Figure 2: Impulse Response of Unemployment to a Separation Shock
In Figure 2 with free entry of vacancies (FE), the impulse response func-
tion of unemployment to a job separation shock yields a relatively small in-
crease in unemployment which quickly recovers to its steady state value. As
described in Shimer (2005), the free entry approach yields too little volatil-
ity and persistence. Diamond entry with ξ = 1/2 (DE) instead generates a
much higher unemployment peak and greater persistence. Figure 3, which
describes the corresponding impulse response function for vacancies, reveals
why.
Free entry of vacancies (FE) implies vacancies instantaneously increase
given a rise in unemployment. This vacancy response ensures unemployment
quickly recovers to its long run steady state value and the model demonstrates
little persistence (the persistence observed is largely due to the separation
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Figure 3: Impulse Response of Vacancies to a Separation Shock
process being an AR1 process). This of course reflects the original insights
in Shimer (2005).
In contrast with Diamond entry (DE), Figure 3 demonstrates the vacancy
stock falls as unemployment increases. The job destruction shock generates a
rising tide of unemployed workers, some of whom quickly re-match with the
existing vacancy stock. As vacancy creation rates are inelastic (compared
to free entry) such oversampling causes the vacancy stock to fall. Unem-
ployed worker job finding rates then plummet as the increasing number of
unemployed workers chase few remaining vacancies.
For the same job destruction shock, reducing the vacancy creation elastic-
ity from ξ = 1 to ξ = 1/2 finds unemployment grows more and is even more
persistent. This occurs as vacancy creation rates respond even more slowly
to rising unemployment. As identified in Table 5, lower ξ thus generates
greater variation and persistence in unemployment, the vacancy stock and
job finding rates (as implied by market tightness θ = V/U).
This impulse response function might suggest that job creation rates in-
crease following a job destruction shock. An important property of the cal-
ibration, however, is the correlated shock structure: that a large separation
shock (in expectation) is followed by a persistent low productivity phase. By
reducing new job creation rates, the low productivity phase further reduces
the recovery rate of the economy. In the Conclusion we relate this insight to
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the New Keynesian macro-approach.
4.4 Persistence and covariance of Unemployment and
Vacancy stocks.
Table 6 describe the persistence and covariance of unemployment and vacan-
cies over the cycle.
Table 6: Persistence in unemployment and vacancies
Serial Persistence Data Free Entry Diamond ξ = 1 Diamond ξ = 1/2
cor(ut, ut−1) 0.94 0.85 0.95 0.96
cor(vt, vt−1) 0.94 0.77 0.96 0.96
cor(ut, vt) -0.89 0.33 -0.93 -0.97
Notes: cor(ut, ut−1): correlation between ut and ut−1. To calculate the statistics:
simulated data are quarterly averages of monthly series, in logs as deviations from
an HP trend with smoothing parameter 105.
The first two rows describe the autocorrelation of vacancy and unemploy-
ment stocks. Both versions of ”Diamond entry” generate the right degree of
persistence, though the free entry case does reasonably well in this dimen-
sion. The big difference, however, is how unemployment and vacancies covary
over the cycle. Row 3 describes the Beveridge curve: that the covariance of
vacancies with unemployment is large and very negative. The free entry case
obtains the wrong correlation, the reason being that the job separation pro-
cess does not imply small shocks. In contrast both ”Diamond entry” models
find vacancies and unemployment covary negatively. Indeed the negative
covariance would seem a little too strong.
4.5 A Second Calibration Test.
Shimer (2012) argues that the observed variation in unemployment is pri-
marily due to variations in worker re-employment rates. To understand that
argument, note that steady state unemployment
u =
x
x+ f
where x is the (steady state) exit rate of employed workers into unemploy-
ment, f the rate unemployed workers become employed. It turns out for
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aggregate data, that the unemployment proxy
uPt =
xt
xt + ft
,
where xt is the period t exit rate and ft the job finding rate, is a surprisingly
good approximation for actual unemployment ut. This proxy variable can
then be decomposed into job separation effects (variations in xt) and job
finding effects (variations in ft). For example putting xt = x, the sequence
x/(x+ft) describes the variation in u
P
t due solely to variations in ft. Similarly
xt/(xt+f) describes the variation in u
P
t due to variations in xt. Shimer (2012)
defines the contribution of the job finding rate to variations in unemployment
as the covariance of ut and x/(x+ft) divided by the variance of ut. Column 1,
Table 1 in Shimer (2012) reports that 77% of the variation in unemployment
is explained by variations in the job finding rate ft, while variations in the job
separation rate xt instead explain only 24%.
4 Thus unemployment variations
are much more highly correlated with variations in worker job finding rates.
We repeat this decomposition on simulated data generated by the Dia-
mond entry model with ξ = 0.5.5 For this data, the proxy variable uPt =
xt/(xt + ft) is indeed very highly correlated with the model generated un-
employment ut. Computing the same statistics finds job finding variations,
x/(x+ ft), explain 70% of the unemployment variation, while job separation
variations xt/(xt + f) explain only 24%. Thus the simulated data exhibit
the same properties. The interpretation however, is very different. As we
now show, the unemployment dynamics here are driven by infrequent but
large job separation shocks. Unemployment is more highly correlated with
job finding rates simply because job destruction shocks are short-lived while
the propagation mechanism implies job finding rates fall (endogenously) as
more unemployed workers chase fewer vacancies.
5 How Important are Job Destruction Shocks?
We use our structural model (with ξ = 0.5) to decompose the separate con-
tributions of job destruction shocks and productivity shocks on the volatility
of unemployment, vacancies and job finding rates (market tightness). First
4see Figures 4 and 6 in Elsby et al (2009) and Table 1 in Fujita and Ramey (2009) for
alternative estimates.
5with xt ≡ δt and ft ≡ (1− δt)m(θt).
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we shut down all productivity shocks (i.e. set pt = p = 1) and suppose job
destruction process
ln δt = ρδ ln δt−1 + (1− ρδ) ln δ + ηt
as previously calibrated. Column 3 in Table 7 describes the model generated
volatilities of unemployment, vacancies and market tightness (job destruction
only). Second we instead shut down separation shocks by putting δt = δ,
and suppose productivity follows the AR1 process as previously calibrated.
Column 4 describes the results. Column 5 reports the results previously
obtained when both shock processes are active.
Table 7: volatility of unemployment and vacancies by shock process (ξ = 0.5)
Volatility Data Job Destruction only Productivity Shocks only Both
σu 0.19 0.14 0.025 0.17
σv 0.20 0.13 0.044 0.17
σv/u 0.38 0.27 0.069 0.34
Notes: σu: standard deviation of variable u. To calculate the statistics: simulated
data are quarterly averages of monthly series, in logs as deviations from an HP trend
with smoothing parameter 105.
Table 7 establishes that the job destruction process is the principal reason
for the large volatility in unemployment, vacancies and job finding rates.
Productivity shocks by themselves (Column 4) yield only 15% of the observed
volatility of unemployment. This latter result occurs as the assumed surplus
(pt−z)/z is not small, and so small productivity shocks are not amplified into
large variations in unemployment. The model would thus ”fail” the Shimer
(2005) critique as currently interpreted. But that interpretation supposes
that job destruction shocks are small. Relaxing that restriction not only
generates an excellent fit of the data (Tables 2 and 3), the results remain
consistent with Shimer (2012) which finds that variations in unemployment
are more highly correlated with variations in worker job finding rates.
6 New Business Start-Ups and the Cycle.
In the working paper version of this paper, Coles and Moghaddasi (2011)
instead suppose it = FH(it) describes vacancy creation by new business
start-ups. It also showed how to incorporate time-to-build constraints. That
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approach was partly motivated by Figure 4 below. Using data contained in
the BDS, which is an annual census of firms in the U.S.,6 Figure 4 describes
(net) job creation in the U.S by (i) new start-up firms (defined as firms aged
less than one year) and (ii) existing firms (defined as firms which existed in
the previous census year).
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Figure 4: Net job Creation in U.S. by (i) Start-up firms and (ii) Existing firms
There are two important features of this data. Note first that
• net job creation at pre-existing firms (those firms more than one year
old) are, on average, negative while net job creation by new start-ups
is positive and large, being around 3 million new jobs a year.
Such job turnover is consistent with the concept of creative destruction, where
new firms with better technologies gradually drive pre-existing firms out of
business (e.g. Caballero and Hammour (1994), Klette and Kortum (2004),
Lentz and Mortensen (2008) among many others). The key business cycle
observation, however, is that
6The Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS) is available at
http://webserver03.ces.census.gov/index.php/bds/bds database list. Kane (2010)
was the first to aggregate the data as described in Figure 2.
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• job creation rates by new business start-ups is largely invariant to the
cycle whereas there are large, but infrequent, spikes of net employment
loss at pre-existing firms.
The model is entirely consistent with this view of the business cycle:
the job creation process is inelastic [by start-ups] while employment [at pre-
existing firms] is liable to large, but infrequent losses. The working paper
version was criticised for ignoring that existing firms are responsible for the
large part of gross hires. This version has simply reinterpreted variables more
appropriately.
7 Conclusion.
The challenge for any equilibrium theory of unemployment and vacancies is
to explain the following facts, that
• (a) vacancies covary negatively with unemployment; e.g. Shimer (2005),
• (b) there is large unemployment volatility even though productivity
shocks are small; e.g. Shimer (2005) and
• (c) variations in unemployment are much more highly correlated with
worker job finding rates than with employed worker separation rates;
e.g. Shimer (2012).
The DMP approach with free entry of vacancies can generate this outcome
by assuming small job destruction shocks and small surplus (see Sargent and
Lyungqvist (2014) for a recent discussion). Here we have identified an al-
ternative structure which provides a very different view of the timing and
progression of recessions. The implied unemployment dynamics are not only
perfectly consistent with data properties (a)-(c), they are also consistent with
the original job creation/job destruction insights of Davis and Haltiwanger
(1992). Furthermore once large job destruction shocks are allowed, small
surplus and sticky wage arguments play a less direct role in explaining un-
employment dynamics.
The Great Financial Crash of 2007/8 establishes that financial failures
play an important role in generating large job destruction shocks. Extend-
ing our approach to consider financial failure is an important direction for
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future research. There is some work on this issue in frictional labor mar-
kets, see for example Hall (2014) and Eckstein et al (2014). Our view of the
timing and progression of unemployment dynamics is also complementary
to the New Keynesian macro-approach. Here the correlated shock structure
implies a large job destruction shock is followed (in expectation) by a persis-
tent low productivity phase. This latter low productivity phase reduces the
recovery rate of the economy. A New Keynesian macro approach potentially
endogenises the low productivity phase as a low aggregate demand outcome
which, here, could be due to persistently high unemployment.
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